8 edition of future of nuclear deterrence found in the catalog.
Includes bibliographies and index.
|Statement||George H. Quester.|
|LC Classifications||U162.6 .Q44 1986|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||xiv, 333 p. :|
|Number of Pages||333|
|ISBN 10||0669115657, 0669123218|
|LC Control Number||85045343|
Put another way, the U. Since the Eisenhower administration, U. By Christopher P. For some NATO governments — principally in countries formerly under Soviet subjugation and which joined the Alliance after the Cold War — these deployments have become part of the political coinage of trans-Atlantic solidarity.
The eventual escalations to the all-out bombings of cities we remember are typically blamed on the Nazi dictator, but a close reading of the escalation sequence suggests that Winston Churchill made more of the key decisions. For the role of reputation in U. This may have little or nothing to do with the weapons themselves. It has also opted to keep tactical nuclear weapons out of its nuclear arsenal.
Furthermore, at least some Japanese and South Korean officials expect that there are circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used. Coercive credibility[ edit ] Finally, coercive credibility requires that, in addition to calculations about costs and future of nuclear deterrence book of cooperation, the defending state convincingly conveys to the attacking state that non-cooperation has consequences. Pre-nuclear deterrence Important earlier examples can be found in the thinking about conventional aerial bombardment that emerged during and even before World War I, then in the years between the world wars, and during the escalation of aerial bombing in World War II when the great majority of strategic planners knew nothing about nuclear weapons. But what is shared with the cold war pattern of discussions about nuclear deterrence is the necessity of painful punishment.
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That's how we operationalize deterrence today and how we will in part do so in the future. Other countries, future of nuclear deterrence book as the United Kingdom and Francehave only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons.
In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing future of nuclear deterrence book threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and possibly war.
In that case, the capabilities the United States has in Asia for such a contingency would necessarily play some role in defining the context of Sino-American rivalry. Smaller countries like North Korea already see nuclear weapons as a great equalizer.
It does not mean, however, that nuclear deterrence is an "anachronism. Pryor questions whether the benefits of the U. Given imperfect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISR capabilities, knowing exactly where North Korean mobile missile launchers are will prove difficult at best.
It thrives in military affairs, in law enforcement, in regulatory and administrative affairs, and in innumerable aspects of everyday human life. By contrast, Russia remains invested in an approach that stresses its nuclear capabilities p.
Our current Air Force nuclear deterrent capability comprises just 2. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Along the way, the book provides an introduction to various aspects of deterrence theory, including the balance of terror, mutual assured destruction, strategies of denial and punishment, and escalation ladders.
She began her studies with a B. Our National Military Strategy characterizes the U. It is practically impossible for Washington to make the nuclear umbrella credible as a deterrent due to the military and reputational problems attendant with nuclear use, so allies can never be completely reassured.
If Japan did not seek cover under the U. Our ability to effectively prevent major-power conflict, prevent crises escalation, respond to changing regional military balances, and maintain effective alliances ultimately rests on a foundation of U.
And Pakistani nuclear modernization drives a response in India which has implications for China. Is this simply a matter of educating U.
Confidence-building measures for instance, among nuclear-armed neighbors will likely become more important during regional crises. Beijing does possess a quantitative advantage in ships and aircraft, but Tokyo does not need parity with China to effectively impose high military costs that could deter Chinese overreach.
If all defending states have such incentives, then potential attacking states may discount statements made by defending states along with any movement of military forces as merely bluffs.
Without putting one to boredom, the book comprehensively details out every important aspect that India needs to achieve in order to hone its nuclear arsenal. Roehrig believes the promise of the nuclear umbrella keeps nuclear proliferation at bay, yet acknowledges a real tension between the umbrella and stated nonproliferation goals.
The take-home message is that the greatest challenges for the future are not technical or scientific, but political. Today, however, modern conventional weapons provide the United States and its allies with other means for countering quantitatively superior adversaries without the same need for nuclear weapons.
Still, if one explores the topic of nuclear weapons and extended deterrence in Asia beyond Japan and the Korean Peninsula, there is stronger grounds for pessimism about the region future of nuclear deterrence book his analysis concludes.Sep 21, · Deterrence [Lawrence Freedman] on galisend.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
In this important and groundbreaking new book, Lawrence Freedman develops a distinctive approach to future of nuclear deterrence book evaluation of deterrence as both a state of mind and a strategic option.
This approach is applied to post-cold war crisis management5/5(3). II. Nuclear Deterrence. For our purposes today, therefore, the real question concerns the future of deterrence in its specifically nuclear forms – the nuclear species, as it were, of the genus deterrencia.
This, in turn, means that we must grapple with ongoing debates about the role that nuclear weapons play in modern security affairs. Read this book on Questia. Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers.COO pdf New Generation Warfare Center Greg Melcher discusses the technological, political and military landscape of the post-INF Treaty world, nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States, and the nuclear threat posed by Russia and China.Russia's Nuclear Dependence and START Realism and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Information Warfare and Nuclear Deterrence Limited Nuclear War in the Old and New World Orders --Conclusion: The Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence.
Responsibility: Stephen J. Cimbala.This acount can be warmly recommended to any eager scholar of nuclear deterrence theory or, ebook, anyone interested in the history of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy.?-Studies in Conflict & Terrorism?Cimbala provides sound research that greatly contributes to ongoing discussions of nuclear deterrence.?-Military ReviewCited by: 8.